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Abstract 
This paper develops a role for differences in household tastes and 
policies that influence household behavior as sources of persistent or 
permanent differences between national or regional productivity growth rates, 
under perfect international financial capital mobility. We show that when 
households are constrained in the trade of some essential input into the 
production of nontraded human capital, productivity growth differentials arise 
even with common technologies and industrial structures and with constant 
returns from scale. We discuss two alternative sources of nontradedness. One 
is that there are essential "home-grown" inputs to human capital augmentation 
(represented by time spent in education). The other is that households cannot 
borrow against future labor income to finance education and training. In a 
two-country overlapping generations model, we show that intergenerational 
redistributions, using either balanced-budget policies or the issuing of 
public debt, that reduce private financial saving as conventionally defined 
tend to increase human capital formation. We also analyze the effects of 
residence-based taxes on savings, subsidies to borrowing for human capital 
formation and public provision of inputs into education and training. 
Key Words: Endogenous growth, productivity growth differentials, fiscal 
policy. 
JEL Classification Numbers: 04, F43, H6 
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(1) INTRODUCTION. 
Much of the rapidly growing literature on endogenous growth has 
emphasized increasing returns to scale and/or differences in technology, 
factor endowments, initial conditions and industrial structure as explanations 
for persistent and permanent differences in productivity growth rates between 
nations and regions!. Where a two-or multi-country approach is adopted, the 
richness of the specification of technology and firm behavior stands in stark 
contrast to the sparseness of the specification of the household sector, which 
seldom ventures beyond the identical representative consumer. 
When differences in technology and industrial structure are not present, 
as in some of the work of Barro [1989a,b] and in Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
[1990b], differences in tastes and in other determinants of household behavior 
can yet account for permanent productivity growth differentials, as long as 
international or interregional factor mobility is restricted2 • 
The first objective of this paper is to restate and develop the role of 
differences in household behavior as a source of persistent and permanent 
differences between national or regional productivity growth rates, in a world 
with perfect international mobility of financial capital. We present our 
argument about the importance of household tastes and of policies influencing 
household behavior when there are constant returns to scale with common 
technologies and industrial structures between nations or regions. We do not 
deny that increasing returns or asymmetries in technology and industrial 
structure may be an important part of the story of unequal growth and 
development. For expository reasons, however, we abstract from these possible 
sources of permanent productivity growth differentials. 
Under the assumptions of free international technology transfer, constant 
returns to scale, perfect international financial capital mobility and no 
non-traded essential growth inputs, most existing growth models (of both the 
exogenous and the endogenous variety) would imply global convergence of output 
per worker. Differences in national savings rates would not account for 
differences in national rates of accumulation of augmentable factors of 
production. In the simplest version of the model (absent adjustment costs) 
convergence would be immediate. 
The implication that levels and growth rates of output per worker should 
be equalized across the globe, is a source of empirical embarrassment 3 • This 
remains true even if its sharp edges are dulled somewhat by allowing for 
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political and administrative restrictions on the international mobility of 
financial capital and for adjustment costs in the accumulation of augmentable 
factors of production. Our approach starts from the recognition that there 
are important "local" or national essential complementary inputs into the 
production process that cannot be imported but have to be "home-grown". We 
are thinking of the social, political, cultural, legal and educational 
infrastructure without which modes of production and economic organization 
conducive to high productivity cannot be realized. 
In our formal model, we try to capture some of the essence of these 
"home-grown" inputs by including in the production function non-tradeda 
capital good ("human capital") whose production requires a non-traded input 
(efficiency units of labor time devoted to education and training) that has an 
alternative use in consumption as intrinsically valued leisure. 
An alternative (or complementary) derivation of the household decision 
rules of our model starts from the assumption that expenditures for education 
and training must be self-financed and shows how this requirement can act as a 
constraint on national economic growth. In this approach, the income from 
future human capital cannot be used as collateral for borrowing (including 
international borrowing) to finance education and training when young. 
We realize that our non-traded human capital good whose production 
requires a non-traded current input that has alternative uses as a consumption 
good, captures but very partially our notion of "home-grown" infrastructure. 
Some elements of the home-grown infrastructure (the rule of law, the clear 
definition and defense of property rights, the enforcement of contracts and 
general popular attitudes towards entrepreneurship, business and private 
profit) possess aspects of "zero-one" dummy variables (or of variables with a 
bounded range of variation) rather than of capital-like augmentable inputs 
whose quantity can be varied (given time and effort) without upper bound. 
Other "home-grown" inputs such as a skilled and educated labor force fit quite 
easily into our formal straight jacket. It is true that countries can send 
their citizens abroad to advance their education and that the processes of 
education and training within a country can make use of imported inputs. 
This, however, is and has been historically, of second-order importance. 
In our formal model, human capital cannot be traded at all. This, 
·however,· is but an analytically convenient simplifying assumption. Our key 
non-convergence result goes through even if human capital can be traded, as 
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long as the importable human capital goods are not perfect substitutes for the 
domestically produced ones. Similarly, in the alternative interpretation of 
our model, the self-financing constraint on education and training 
expenditures can be relaxed without affecting the main qualitative 
conclusions, as long as human capital is inferior to physical capital and 
financial claims as collateral for borrowing. 
The second objective of our paper is the analysis of the role of policies 
that affect human capital formation and private financial saving. Among the 
policies we consider are those that effect direct lump-sum intergenerational 
redistribution, either in balanced-budget fashion or through the issuing of 
public debt. A two-country OLG model is the natural vehicle for investigating 
these issues4. We .show that intergenerational redistribution policies that 
cause "financial crowding out" and reduce conventionally measured private 
saving are likely to boost human capital formation. 
The conventional system of national income, expenditure and product 
accounts fails to register most of a key input into the human capital 
formation process: time spent in education and training. In addition, it 
fails to record altogether the output of that process: the increase in the 
stock of human capital. It does register (correctly) as negative household 
saving the borrowing by households in order to finance purchases of marketed 
inputs into human capital formation. The purchase of these traded inputs is, 
however, erroneously classified as consumption rather than as household 
investment. This has the important implication that it is not necessarily 
true that any policy which reduces conventionally measured domestic saving is 
growth-unfriendly. Even in the real world, loans taken out by younger 
households need not be consumption loans, but may instead be used to finance 
growth-enhancing unrecorded human capital formation. 
In addition to considering the effects on growth differentials of direct 
intergenerational redistribution, we also consider the effects of 
residence-based taxes on savings, of subsidies to borrowing for human capital 
formation and of the free provision of public sector inputs into the education 
and learning process5. 
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops 
the model. Section 3 contains the main results concerning the effects of 
international differences in household tastes and in budgetary policies on 
international productivity growth differentials. Section 4 addresses in some 
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detail the issue of intergenerational redistribution policies, human capital 
formation and financial crowding out. Section 5 concludes. 
(2) THE MODEL. 
a. Household behavior. 
The decisions concerning consumption, labor supply, human capital 
formation and financial portfolio allocation are taken by households. The 
a three period overlappinghousehold sector in each country is modeled through 
generations model. We only derive the household decision rules for the home 
arecountry. The corresponding decision rules for the foreign households 
obtained attaching the superscript * to foreign taste parameters and household 
The same notational convention will be followed for firmschoice variables. 
are many identical consumers in each generation,and governments. While there 
consumerswe will only use an additional subscript to designate individual 
where this is required to avoid ambiguity. 
In the first period of her life ('youth'), a consumer born in period t 
has an endowment of time, ho when measured in efficiency units, which she t 
can either choose to consume as leisure, it in period tor to allocate to an 
alternative use, which we shall call education, et This education process 
during the first period of the household's life adds to the endowment of labor 
time in efficiency units h
1 
during the second period ('middle age'), that is 
t"' 
during period t+l for a household born in period t. 
While young the household can also choose to spend private resources 
other than time on human capital formation. Such private spending on 
education will have to be financed by borrowing, since the household is 
income in the firstborn without financial endowment and does not earn any 
Public spending on the education of an individual youngperiod of its life. 
household, also boosts h~. For simplicity the young are assumed not to 
pay any taxes or to receive any transfer payments other than the benefits from 
the "transfer in kind" gt, which cannot be resold by the recipient. 
Endogenous growth is permitted in our model because of two features of 
the technology. First, the production function of traded output is constant 
returns to scale in two inputs that can be accumulated, human and physical 
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capital. Second, the production of the two augmentable inputs is itself 
subject to constant returns to scale in the traded good and the augmentable 
inputs6. 
Human capital lives on after death. Formally we model this by assuming 
0
that hjt' the amount of time measured in efficiency units (human capital) 
which the j 
th 
household of generation tis endowed with at birth, is given by 
the average amount of human capital achieved by the previous generation during 
middle age, that is, letting Nt denote the number of households-consumers in 
period t, 
Nt-1 
1 ~ h 1 
N it-1
t-1 i=l 
Each member of a new generations stands, as regards its starting level of 
human capital (knowledge, education), on the shoulders of the average member 
of the previous generation. We also assume, although this is not essential to 
obtain endogenous growth, that there is an externality in the human capital 
0 1 
formation process. From the definition of hjt' it is clear that hjt-l is 
non-rival with respect to the levels of human capital achieved in period t by 
members of generation t. If generation tis larger, more members of 
generation twill benefit from the higher average level of education achieved 
by the previous generation. 





, is non-excludable. Those in generation teffect of hjt-l it 
who benefit from the knowledge accumulated by generation t-1 cannot be made to 
pay for these benefits. By permitting the use of purchased inputs in the 
human capital accumulation process, our human capital accumulation mechanism 
extends the one developed by Lucas [1988], following Razin [1972] and Ozawa 
[1965]. Azariadis and Drazen [1990] developed a very general specification of 
the intergenerational transmission of human capital, which encompasses ours
7 • 
Borjas (1992] presents empirical evidence for human capital externalities by 
showing that the average level of human capital of an individual's ethnic 
group for the previous generation positively affects the individual's 
productivity level.8 
The per capita stock of human capital used in employment by generation t 
during period t+l, ht'
1 
is assumed to be a constant returns to scale function 
6 
of the current inputs et' mt and gt and the inherited per capita stock of 
human capital h~, which equals the per capita level of human capital achieved 
1
by the previous generation h • 
t-1 
We believe our assumption of an intergenerational.externality in human 
capital accumulation to be realistic. It also solves the technical problem, 
first highlighted by Jones and Manuelli [1990b], of endowing new generations 
in an OLG model with an asset whose value will grow at the endogenously 
determined growth rate. 
During middle age, the only household choice concerns how much to 
1 
consume, ct. The entire endowment of labor time services in efficiency units 
h~ is supplied inelastically in the labor market. Lump-sum taxes (transfers 
'f t' l 'dl. nega 1.ve) Tt are pa1.. 
In the last period of life ('old age' or 'retirement') households do not 
work or educate themselves. The old consume c!, which equals the value of 
the resources they carried into old age through saving in the first two period 
of their lives, minus any lump-sum taxes r! paid in their last period. 
Formally, each competitive9 household of generation t, (t ~ 0) maximizes 
1 
is lifetime utility function Ut, given in (1) with respect to lt, et' mt' ht' 
1 2 




(3) = ho -lt ett 
et mt+gt
hl ho(4) 
t = t (1 + ¢<a, --)]ho
ht t 
1 2 




Equation 2 is the lifetime budget constraint of a representative member 
of generation t. wt+l is the wage paid per unit of efficiency labor in period 
t+l. The before-tax interest factor on loans from period t to period t+l is 
1 + rt+l· Otis the period t residence-based tax rate on all non-human asset 
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income in the home country. It is therefore also the subsidy rate to all 
domestic borrowing, including borrowing by the young. We also consider the 
financesubsidization of "student loans" (borrowing by the young to 
expenditures on traded goods used in human capital formation) as a policy 
on these loans. we·assumeinstrument. ~ is the subsidy rate that r! and r! 





¢(.,.), the constant returns to scale production function for the growth 
is positive when both its argumentsof the household's human capital stock, 
assume positive values, has positive but diminishing marginal products to both 
inputs and is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable. 
Our assumption of perfect substitutability of public and private traded 
inputs into the human capital formation process has two virtues. The first is 
analytical simplicity. The second is that it avoids an all too easy (and not 
a in the human capitalvery convincing) way of creating role for government 
formation process: assuming m and g to be imperfect substitutes11. Note that 
there is no externality in the 1 process: public expenditure on education 
th 
benefiting the i 
th 
individual can only be enjoyed by the i individual: it is 
cannot be resold by the recipient.excludable and rival. It also 
Equation (5) gives the intergenerational transmission of human capital. 
(5) h~ = h!_1 
Population grows at a constant proportional rate: 
(6) n > -1; N > 0.0 
The solution to the household optimization problem is given by equations 
Equation (7) is the familiar martingale condition for the discounted 
marginal utility of consumption. Equation (8) equates the marginal utility of 
leisure in period t to the discounted marginal utility of the extra 
consumption permitted in period t+l by allocating an additional unit of time 
8 
to education in period t. Equation (9) equates the marginal cost of borrowing 
to finance additional traded inputs into the education process to the value of 
the marginal product of the traded education input. Note that (9) does not 
involve the utility function of the household. Borrowing to finance the 
purchase of additional traded inputs into the education process can be decided 
by the household as if it were a profit maximizing firm, that is with 
reference to the productive efficiency criterion alone. 
With perfect international integration of financial markets, the use of 
traded productive inputs alone will therefore not result in taste differences 
generating permanent differences in human capital accumulation rates and in 
productivity growth rates. It is equation (8) that accounts for the 
dependence of the optimal value of the non-traded human capital accumulation 
input on the parameters of the utility function and thus for the possibility 
of permanent productivity growth differentials. 
The household decision rules for the foreign country are completely 
analogous to those for the home country and will not be reproduced here. 
Parameters, variables and functions with the superscript * will characterize 
the foreign country. Note that while all taste and policy parameters can 
differ between the two countries, the human capital accumulation technology 
(~, a, p and 0) is the same in both countries. 
Self-financing.vs. non-tradedness. 
The essential implications of this paper do not depend on the specific 
details of the human capital accumulation mechanism we assume, which relies 
heavily on education-leisure choice. An alternative (or complementary) 
mechanism giving rise to the same qualitative conclusions is based on 
plausible constraints on households' abilities to borrow against labor 
earnings to finance educational expenditures. For simplicity, assume that the 
young can allocate their endowment of efficiency time h~ either to leisure, 
lt' or to work. To make the point as clearly as possible, the role of 
non-traded education in human capital accumulation is omitted. Only private 
traded inputs and public traded inputs enter in the human capital formation 
process, as given in (10). 
m +g 
(10) h! = h~[l + l< t 0t)J 
ht 
9 
The proportional growth function tis positive when its argument is 
positive,increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable. 
The key capital market imperfection in this alternative model is that 
private traded inputs in human capital formation can be financed only out of 
concurrent labor income. Borrowing against expected future labor income in 
order to finance the purchase of mt is not permitted. The belief that capital 
market imperfections constrain human capital accumulation by households is 
widespread and supported by empirical studies of educational attainment 12 • 
Becker [1975) discusses borrowing constraints in theoretical models of human 
capital accumulation at length. Barro, Mankiw and Sala i Martin [1992] also 
discuss the importance of self-financing constraints for convergence of growth 
rates under international capital mobility. 
This gives us the following self-financing constraint 
0
(11) mt~ wt(ht - it) 
The revised household budget constraint for this model is 
(12) (l+rt+l-Ot+l)[(h~ - lt)wt - mt)+ h!wt+l - c! - r! 
O -l 2 2 ) ) 0- (l+rt+2- t+2) (ct+ r t -
The competitive household maximizes (1) subject to (10), (11) and (12). 
When the self-financing constraint (11) is not binding, the first-order 
conditions of the household are: 
(13) u'(c!) = (1 + rt+2 - 0t+2 )Pu'(c!) 
(14) 
(15) 
It is apparent from equation (15) that, when the self-financing 
constraint for human capital formation is not binding, the household's optimal 
choice of mt is, for given values of the interest rate and the wage rate, 
independent of taste parameters (time preference,- intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, labor-leisure choice). With perfect international capital 
mobility equalizing interest rates and wage rates world-wide (ignoring 
distortionary taxes), international differences in the growth rates of human 
capital can therefore not be attributed to international differences in 
household preferences or to international differences in policies influencing 
10 
saving or labor-leisure choice. 
When the self-financing constraint (11) binds, the return to financial 
saving in the first period of life (l+rt+l-Ot+l) is less than the return to 
investing in human capital (!'wt+l). The first-order conditions of the 
household are given by (13) and 
(16) mt= wt(h~ - it) 
(17) 
The utility-of-leisure cost of increasing mt (on the left-hand-side of 
(17)) is equated to the additional utility of consumption in period t+l 
permitted by the rise in h~ caused by the increase in mt (on the 
right-hand-side of (17)). The growth rate of human capital will therefore be 
a function of the parameters characterizing household preferences. 
Comparing equations (8) and (9) with equations (16) and (17), the 
qualitative properties of our model will be the same when we assign a key role 
to the non-tradedness of an essential growth input, as when we invoke a 
binding self-financing constraint for a traded growth input (one difference is 
noted later). In the version of the self-financing constraint presented here, 
it is labor-leisure choice rather than education-leisure choice that causes 
the growth rate of human capital to depend on household preferences and on 
policies affecting household behavior. Both mechanisms may well be operative 
in practice. 
If the model is generalized slightly by permitting the household to 
consume traded goods when young, a binding self-financing constraint on the 
sum of consumption when young and educational expenditures causes the growth 
rate of human capital to depend on the time preference rate and other 
characteristics of household preferences, even if labor supply is exogenous. 
For expositional simplicity we restrict our formal analysis in what follows to 
the case of the essential non-traded growth input. 
b. Firm behavior. 
Firms face competitive output and input markets and maximize profits. 
Non-negative quantities of the two factors of production, human capital (or 
efficiency units of labor) and physical capital, can be varied costlessly. 
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All firms are identical. The representative firm's production function is 
linear homogeneous in the two factors of production, increasing in both its 
arguments, strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable and satisfies 
the Inada conditions. Capital depreciation is ignored. 
The aggregate production function for the home country is given in 
inputs, humanequation (18). It exhibits constant returns to scale in the two 
and physical capital, is increasing, strictly concave and satisfies the Inada 
conditions. The representative domestic firm's first-order conditions 
equating the real interest rate to the marginal product of capital and the 
real wage to the marginal product of efficiency labor are given are given in 
equations (19) and (20) respectively. Y denotes aggregate output, K the 
aggregate physical capital stock, H the aggregate stock of human capital and 
k =K/H. 
(18) yt = Htf(kt) 
( 19) rt = f' (kt) 
W' = -k f''(k) > 0(20) wt= f(kt) - ktf'(kt) = W(kt)' t t . 
rate isThe derivation of foreign country output, interest rate and wage 
identical productionanalogous. Note that the two countries also have 




In both countries the government spends on the education of its young, 
taxes all asset incomelevies lump-sum taxes on the middle aged and the old, 
of its residents at a proportional rate 0, subsidizes education loans at a 
any excessproportion rate~, pays interest on its debt and borrows to finance 
of current outlays over current revenues. Government debt is single-period 
debt denominated in the traded output. The outstanding stock of home country 
government debt outstanding is Bt. The home country government single-period 
budget identity is given in equation (21). The conventional solvency 
constraints, given in (22a) is assumed to apply13. The foreign country 
counterparts are obvious and have been omitted. 
1 2 
( 21 ) 8t+l = ( 1 + rt)Bt + gt
Nt - rt-1Nt-1 - r t-2Nt-2 
12 
2 + T2C 
- 0 {[ t-2 t-2 ]N 
t 1 + r - 0 t-2 t t 





B and B* are given.
0 0 
The budget identity and the solvency constraint of the home government 
together imply the present value budget constraint given in (22b). 
C • 2 + T • 2 
[Il [ 1 T 2 • N , + 0 t+i- t+i-= A . r . N . + t+i-2 t+i-2 t+i[ ]Nt+i-2t+i t+i-1 t+i-16 2 2 
1+rt+i-8t+i 
- <8t+i + ft+i)mt+i-lNt+i-1 - 9t+iNt+~ 
i 
At+i - Ilc1+rt+j>-1 
j=O 
This says that the outstanding value of the public debt should be equal 
to the present discounted value of the future primary (non-interest) public 
sector budget surpluses. 




-T is the present value (discounted to period t+l) of the net lifetime 
t 
lump-sum fiscal transfer to a member of generation t. Note that 
(l+rt+l-Ot+l-~t+l)gt, the period t+l value of the public educational inputs 
spent on a member of generation t, can be viewed as income-in-kind, it is not 
a lump-sum transfer. 
d. Market equilibrium. 
There is perfect international mobility of financial capital. In the 
absence of distortionary source-based taxes on capital income, the domestic 
and foreign before-tax interest rates and rates of return on fixed capital 
will be equalized. 
(24) 
13 
1 + rt - Ot in the homeThe after-tax rates of return to private saving, 
country and 1 + rt - 0t* in the foreign country, however, can differ. 
From the production function, equalization of capital-human capital 
ratios in the two economies implies that the wage rates (of efficiency labor) 
in the two countries are also equalized, although labor itself is not traded 
internationally and workers are not internationally mobile. 
(25) 
The fact that both countries' labor markets clear each period means that 
1
(26a) Ht= ht-lNt-1 
* *l * 
(26b) Ht= ht-lNt-1 
Home country private financial wealth at the beginning of period t+l, 
At+l' is given by (27a). Ft+l denotes the net foreign assets of the home 
* country at the beginning of period t+l. Note that F = - F . 
1 1 1 
(27a) At+l - (wtht-1 - C t-1 - rt-1 - (1 + rt - ot ~t)mt-l]Nt-1 - mtNt 
(27b) Ft+l - At+l - Kt+l - 8t+l 
The old (those born in period t-2) will not be holding any assets: they 
have at the end of period t just exhausted the last of their lifetime savings. 
The savings of the middle aged (those born in period t-1) will be the sum of 
their primary (non-interest) current surpluses during middle age (wth~-l -
c~-l - r~-l per person of generation t-1) and their compounded primary current 
surpluses from their youth (- (1 + rt - 0 - ~ )m per member of generationt t t-1 
t-1). The young at the end of period twill have negative per capita savings 
equal to -mt' the value of their borrowing to finance their education (student 
loans). 
The condition for equilibrium in the world capital market is given in 
equation (30), where equalization of domestic and foreign interest rates and 
wage rates has already been imposed. 
* * * 
(28) Kt+l + Kt+l + 8t+l + 8t+l = At+l + At+l 
Equation (28) states that the total stock of non-human assets at the 
* * beginning of period t+l, Kt+l + Kt+l + Bt+l + Bt+l, has to be willingly held 
by the private sectors of the two countries. 
14 
We define b _ B/H, b* - B * /H * and fJt * is a measure of 
the relative size of the foreign country. Equation (28) can now be rewritten 
as: 
(29) 
We note that there are two different kinds of steady state solutions. In 
the first, the long run growth rate of aggregate human capital differs between 
the two countries. This implies that the relative size of the country with 
the lower growth rate decreases steadily. In the second the long run growth 
* rates are the same. In this case, a steady state can exist in which fJ is 
positive and finite. 
(3) INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH DIFFERENTIALS. 
With perfect financial capital mobility leading to equalization of 
physical capital intensities and of wage rates per unit of efficiency labor, 
it is easily seen that international differences in the growth rate of output 
per worker are due solely to differences in the growth rate of human capital 
1 
f(kt)' output per worker Il inper worker. Noting that Yt = Htf(kt) = ht-lNt_1 
the home country is given by 
1 
Ilt =Yt/Nt-1 = ht-lf(kt) 









* = --t+l - 1.\ft - n* 
t 
15 
It follows that the differences in the growth rate.of output per worker are 
given by: 
(30) 
In steady state 14, the labor productivity growth differential is given 
by: 
*1hl ht* t 
'K - 'K = 1 *1 
ht-1 ht-1 
Equations (4) and (30) imply that the productivity growth differential is 
given by 
(33) 
When the constraint mt~ 0 is not binding, the optimal program of the 
home country generation t household and the factor market equilibrium 
1 
conditions yield equations (34) through to (37). These can be solved for ct, 
c!, et and mt as functions of kt+l' kt+2 , h~_1 , the home country fiscal policy 
1 2 
parameters Ot+l' 0t+2 , ~t+l' rt, rt and gt and the home country subjective 





A set of four equations analogous to (34) through to (37) can be derived 
16 
l* 2* * * 
for the foreign country, allowing us to solve for ct, ct, et and mt as 
l* * 
functions of kt+l' kt+2 , ht-l' the f
oreign fiscal policy parameters Ot+l' 
o* * l* 2* * p*. Ifgt and the foreign subjective discount factort+2' ~t+l' Tt, Tt and 
we restrict ourselves to the analysis of small perturbations away from 
symmetric equilibria (that is, equilibria characterized by identical values of 
across the two countries), theall parameters and identical initial conditions 
effect on the productivity growth differential of small differences in these 
parameters can be analyzed without having to consider the effect of the 
perturbations on kt+l and kt+2 
• We impose this restriction in what follows. 
The effect of changes in taste and policy parameters and in initial conditions 
on the international productivity growth differential can then be found by 
considering the effect on the domestic productivity growth level of changes in 
domestic taste and policy parameters and in domestic initial conditions, at 
given values of kt+l and kt+ • These effects are found from total 2 
differentiation of equations (34)-(37). The appendix provides the resulting 
set of equations simplified to allow straightforward derivation of the effects 
reported below. We know what happens to domestic productivity growth when we 
know what happens to et and to mt+gt. To conserve space, we only report the 
results for the case where the constraint mt~ 0 is binding when the effects 
of variations in gt are discussed. 
A reduction in the time preference rate. 
The signs of the effects of an increase in fJ are the following: 
* 1 
dmt det d('ft-'ft) dct de! 
> a > a is ambiguous > a .arr> a d(J arr arrarr 
The intuition is clear. Reduced impatience lowers the demand for early 
lt, and therefore increases the amount of time spentconsumption of leisure, 
in the human capitalin education while young, et. Since the two inputs 
growth function are complements (¢ > 0), the use of the traded input, mt, 12 
moves in favoralso increases. The productivity growth differential therefore 
of the country with the lower rate of time preference. A higher value of fJ 
also increases the demand for consumption when old, c!, while the effect on 
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1
consumption when middle-aged, ct' is ambiguous. 
Note that with borrowing by the young to finance the purchase of traded 
inputs into the human capital accumulation process, the effect of a lower rate 
of time preference on home country relative private financial wealth is 
ambiguous. This is true even if there is no government debt and the 
government budget is balanced continuously. While a higher value of fi will 
cause the middle-aged to save more, it will also cause the young to dissave 
more by taking out more "student loans" (mt increases). Since the increased 
value of the human capital assets acquired by the young is not counted in 
conventionally measured saving, the net effect of an increase in fi on 
conventionally measured private financial wealth is ambiguous. 
An increase in the present value of life-time lump-sum taxes. 
Note that an increase in lump-sum taxes paid when middle-aged had the 
same effects as an increase in the discounted lump-sum taxes paid when old. 
1 0 -1 2We therefore only discuss the impact of changes in Tt= rt+ (l+rt+ t+2 > rt,2 -
which are as follows: 
Any change in the government's policy concerning borrowing and lump-sum 
taxes and transfers that increases the net life-time lump-sum tax burden on 
generation t, will reduce human capital formation by that generation. The 
negative effect of an increase in Tt on life-time income will reduce 
consumption of leisure while young and consumption of traded goods during 
middle age and old age. The increase in et induces (because e and mare 
complementary inputs, ¢ > 0) an increase in mt. Human capital formation and
12 
productivity growth in the home country are boosted relative to their foreign 
counterparts. 
Higher public spending on the traded human capital accumulation input. 
When the constraint mt> 0 is not binding, the effects of an increase in 
public education expenditure are the following: 
18 
> 0 > 0 • 
As long as the non-negativity constraint on private spending on education 
is not binding, an increase in gt' public spending on ~ducation will lead to a 
reduction in mt+gt, the total amount spent on education by the private and 
public sectors combined. Time spent on education, et' will also be reduced 
and the relative growth rate of home country human capital will decline 
unambiguously. Consumption when middle-aged and when old increase, despite 
1
the reduction in ht' because of the smaller amount of educational debt carried 
into middle age. 
As a profit maximizing firm facing a given wage and interest rate, the 
young worker would respond to the in-kind free gift of gt by reducing his 
private input of mt one for one. The free gift of gt' however, also has an 
income effect on the young worker as a consumer the same as would a decrease 
in T by (l+r -0 -m ) g The net result is the more than 100 percent
t t+l t+l Yt+l t· 
crowding out of private education spending by public spending on education. 
If the increase in public spending on the education of a member of 
generation t, gt' is matched by a corresponding increase in the present 
discounted value of the life-time lump-sum taxes paid by generation t, Tt' so 
as to be distributionally neutral between generations there is no income 
effect associated with the increase in public spending on education, and the 
"direct crowding out" (Suiter [1977)) of private by public spending is exactly 
one-for-one. 
If an aim of policy is to boost human capital formation, this model 
suggests that increasing public spending on education while the private sector 
still engages in private spending on education, would not be very effective. 
An obviously superior policy is one pursued (up to a point) by most 
governments: the removal of the education decision from the realm of private 
decision making. Compulsory school attendance up to a certain age is indeed 
the rule in most societies. It can be checked easily that with administrative 
assignment of e and of g and access to non-distortionary taxes, 
Pareto-efficient equilibria can be supported16. 
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When the mt~ O constraint is binding, the effect of an increase in 
public spending on education, gt' on private time spent on education is 
ambiguous. The increase in the quantity of the complementary factor of 
production gt raises the marginal return to another hour spent in education. 
The income effect, however, goes the other way and suggests an increase in the 
demand for leisure. Even when et declines, however, the net effect on the 
growth rate of human capital is positive. The intuition for this is that the 
positive income effect of the increase in public spending also raises the 
1 2 1 
demand for ct and ct. The net effect of an increase in gt on ht and on the 
home country productivity growth rate is therefore positive when the 
non-negativity constraint on mt is binding. 
The two alternative household models differ with respect to the effects 
of an increase in public spending on private educational inputs. In the 
version in which the household cannot borrow against future labor income to 
finance its educational expenditures, an increase in gt also raises demand for 
leisure when young and demand for consumption during middle age and old age. 
When the self-financing constraint (11) is binding, this leads to a net 
increase in the household's investment in human capital. This happens because 
an increase in gt and an equal discounted present value increase in Tt are not 
equivalent when the constraint on household borrowing while young remains 
binding. In that case, raising consumption while middle aged and old requires 
a rise in the household's accumulation of human capital. If the constraint 
does not bind, then an increase in gt and equal value increase in Tt have the 
same effect (however, crowding out is one-for-one if kt+l and kt+ are2 
constant in that case). 
An increase in the student loan subsidy rate. 
The analysis of the effects of a change in~ 
1 
, the subsidy rate on 
t+ 
student loans taken out in period t, is straightforward. Note that the effect 
on generation t of a change in ~t+l is the same as the effect on generation t 
of a change in 0t+l' the general subsidy to borrowing (tax on lending) 
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undertaken in period t. In addition, a change in O l will affect the 
t+ 
marginal cost of borrowing or lending in period t by generation t-1. We 
consider this below, when we report the effects of a change in 0t+ on
2 
generation t. 
An increase in ~t+l or Ot+l reduces the marginal cost of borrowing to 
finance the purchase of traded inputs in the accumulation of human capital. 
The substitution effect of an increase in the subsidy rate on student loans 
1 2
works to increase mt et, ct and ct. When mt is positive, the positive income 
effect of an increase in~ l or O will reinforce the substitution effects 
t+ t+l 
1 2 
as regards ct and ct. Since leisure is a normal good, however, the income 
effect will tend to reduce et. If the net effect on et is negative, it is 
possible, since et and mt are complementary inputs, that mt also declines, 
despite the reduction in the marginal cost of borrowing. The household as 
consumer of leisure overwhelms the household as producer in this case. If 
both mt and et fall, the home country productivity growth rate declines. Even 
in this case, the total amount of resources carried into middle age will be 
larger as a result of the increase in ~t+l or Ot+l' because of the increased 
subsidy. If income effects are small, the productivity growth differential 
will increase. 
If we compensate for the increased educational subsidy with an increase 
of equal value in Tt (the present discounted value of life-time lump-sum taxes 
paid by generation t) in a way that is distributionally neutral between 
generations, only the marginal incentive effects will be present and mt, et 
* and ~t - ~twill increase unambiguously. 
An increase in the tax on saving during middle age. 
The effects of an increase in O 
t+2 
by one unit on the behavior of 
generation tare the same as the effects of an increase in Tt of magnitude 
2 2 




which has an ambiguous sign. This is the sum of a real income effect from the 
reduction in the marginal return to saving during middle age (changing the 
present value of ct+ +rt+ ) and an intertemporal substitution effect. If
2 2 
2 2 . . . . . 0 1ct+rt is positive, an increase in t+ represents a lo~s of rea income. This 
2 
2 2 
at least partially offset by the negative substitution effect on ct. If rt is 
zero, then the signs of the effects of an increase in O 
t+2 
on the choices of 
generation t depend on whether the equilibrium intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution is greater than, equal to or less than unity. 
If we compensate for the increased tax on saving by the middle-aged (that 
is, for the real income effect of 0t+ only) with a reduction of equal value
2 
in lump-sum taxes, Tt, in a way that is distributionally neutral between 
generations, then the only effects of an increase in O 
t+2 
are the marginal 
incentive effects for generations t and t+l. The substitution effect for 
generation t works to reduce investment in human capital while the 
substitution effect for generation t+l works in the opposite direction, so 
that the net impact on productivity growth rate differentials is ambiguous. 
We can, however, reduce life-time lump-sum taxes for generation t by -Tt to 
compensate for the entire effect of an increase in O on that generation (as
t+2 
part of a distributionally neutral policy), so that the net effect on home 
country productivity growth relative to foreign productivity growth is just 
the positive substitution effect for generation t+l. 17 
Steady-state productivity growth differentials. 
When the preference ordering generating Ut in equation (1) is 
homothetic18 , the steady state version of equations (34) to (37) can be 
written as in equations (38) to (41). 
1 1 2 
(38) u'(c /h ) = (l+f'(k)-0)/Ju'(c /h: )
-1 1 
1 1 ~ e m+g





For a steady state to exist, each exogenous flow variable must be 
constant when expressed as a fraction of human capital per member of the young 
generation, that is, g/h:1 
, r 
1
/h: and r 
2
/h: must be constant. Equations
1 1 




2 1 1 1 1 
and c /h_ as f unct'ions o f {J , O, ~, g /h_ , r /h_ , r 2 /hl_ and k • An analogous 
1 1 1 1 
If we restrict ourselvesset of equations applies to the foreign country. 
again to perturbations of a symmetric stationary equilibrium (identical values 
of all parameters in the two countries), we can analyze the effects of changes 
in taste and policy parameters without having to work out the effect of these 
parameter changes on the steady-state ratio of physical to human capital, k. 
1 1 1 2 1 
Furthermore, the steady state effects of {J , 0, ~, g/h_ , r /h_ and r /h_ on 1 1 1 




, e/h_ , c /h_ and c /h_ (and therefore on the steady state 
1 1 1 
productivity growth differential), are exactly the same as the impact effects 
O 19 1 2 1 
2 , 1 , , 
o f {J , t , ~t' gt, rt and rt on mt, et, ct and ct, given ht-l' derived in the 
previous subsections. 
Only traded inputs into human capital accumulation. 
Inter-country differences in productivity growth rates disappear in our 
model when all inputs into human capital accumulation are tradable. This 
effectively is the case analyzed in Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg [1991]. 
Consider, for example, the following human capital accumulation function in 
which only traded inputs enter: 
1 o o A 
ht= ht{l + n[(mt + gt)/ht] } O<A<l. 
With this strictly concave accumulation function the first order 
condition for mt becomes, when the non-negativity constraint on mt is not 
binding 
noWith perfect international mobility of financial capital and 
differential source-based taxes on capital rentals, the before-tax interest 
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rate will be equalized in the world economy. With a common production 
function the wage rate (per unit of efficiency labor) will also be equalized 
throughout the world economy. With a common human capital accumulation 
technology (common values of~ and A in this example) and common distortionary 
tax rates, the equilibrium value of (mt+ gt)/h~ is equalized throughout the 
world economy. Taste parameters (such as P and P)* therefore no longer matter 
for differences in productivity growth rates. Neither do redistributive 
lump-sum taxation or public sector deficits. The only aspect of fiscal policy 
in our model that matters for growth differentials are the tax rates on 
* * non-human asset income and student loan subsidy rates (8, 8, ~and~). 
Different source-based capital rental tax rates would cet. par. cause 
different wages to be generated in the parts of the world where they apply. 
By raising the return to human capital accumulation a higher home country 
relative real wage would cet. par. increase mt and thus the relative growth 
rate of home country human capital. 
Note that a permanently higher value of~ will cet. par. be associated 
with a permanently higher home country relative growth rate of human capital 
and a permanently higher relative rate of growth of output per worker. An 
increase in 8 will have the same effects. 
Also, higher public spending on education would cet. par. (i.e. without 
allowing for possible consequences for the world rate of interest and the wage 
rate of the financing decisions associated with higher public spending) crowd 
out private spending on education one-for-one: d(mt +gt)= 020. If m and g 
were imperfect substitutes, crowding out would be less than one-for-one. 
If the non-negativity constraint mt~ 0 on private expenditure on 
education is binding, the government can of course boost the growth rate of 
human capital simply by raising gt, its own expenditure on education. 
(4) GOVERNMENT BORROWING AND LUMP-SUM INTERGENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION: MUST 
WHAT HELPS SAVING HURT HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION? 
The discussion of the effect on human capital formation of changes in Tt, 
the present discounted value of life-time lump-sum taxes paid by generation t 
raises a number of important policy issues. We saw that an increase in Tt 
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...raises human capital .formation by generation t. The mechanism is either the 
income effect on time spent in education while young or (in our alternative 
model) the income effect on work performed while young in order to relax a 
binding self-financing constraint on human capital formation. 
One obvious question is whether it is possible to alter Tt systematically 
in the same direction for a (long) sequence of generations, so as to have a 
systematic and lasting influence on the rate of human capital formation 
through lump-sum intergenerational redistribution. The answer will turn out 
to be affirmative, even in steady state. It is possible even when the 
government is restricted to balanced-budget strategies. 
A second question is whether in our model, intergenerational 
redistribution policies that boost human capital formation are necessarily 
also policies that hurt national saving (and thus, in a closed economy, 
physical capital formation). Consider home country financial wealth (private 
plus public) at the beginning of period t+l. 
2 2 
ct-1 + 7t-1 
<42 > At+l - 8t+l = [l+r -8 ]Nt-1-mtNt-8t+l 
t+l t+l 
= 1 1 1 0 
[wtht-1-ct-1-7t-1-(l+rt- t-~t)mt-l]Nt-1-mtNt-8t+l 
It is clear that any policy that increases Tt will, by boosting borrowing 
to finance the purchase of traded inputs into human capital formation, mt' 
reduce financial saving in period t by the young. Unless it increases 
financial saving by the middle aged in period tor by the government, 
conventionally measured national saving falls in period t as a result of the 
credible announcement of the same fiscal action that increases human capital 
formation. 
Even if conventionally defined national financial saving declines, there 
is no necessary policy dilemma. The reason is that the conventional national 
income accounts do not record and value much of the time spent in education 
and training. The savings data correctly record borrowing in order to finance 
the purchase of marketed educational inputs as dissaving, but fail to register 
the associated acquisition of intermediate inputs by the household sector as a 
form of investment. Such loans are therefore by default classified as 
consumption loans. Thus the current resources devoted to human capital 
formation are either not recorded at all (in the case of et) or recorded as 
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consumption (in the case of mt). 
It is easily seen that balanced-budget intergenerational redistribution 
can increase the present discounted value of life-time lump-sum taxes for all 
generations. Consider, for instance, a permanent balanced-budget tax increase 
imposed on the middle-aged with the proceeds used to finance a tax cut for the 
old, that is, a permanent increase in the scale of an unfunded social security 
retirement scheme.2 1 For simplicity let the stock of public debt Bt equal 
zero for all t, and let all distortionary tax rates be zero as well. During 
middle age each person pays a tax increase worthµ and during old age she 
receives a tax reduction worth (1 + n)µ. That is: 
1 -1 2 
drt . = -(1 + n) drt . = µ > 0 for all i ~ -2.+i +i-1 
on generation t+i 
chang::eb:r:s[e::+:::c~u:]te:h:::u:80;0::::::m:,t::•i::::::: rate exceeds the 
1 + rt 2 .+ +i 
rate of growth of population, as we shall assume22 • With leisure a normal 
good, this policy therefore increases forever more the home country allocation 
of time to education and thus the rate of growth of the stock of human capital 
relative to that in the rest of the world. 
This example also illustrates the point that intergenerational 
redistribution that favors human capital formation will tend to reduce 
. conventionally measured financial saving (and vice-versa). As noted before, 
the increase in Tt (for all tin our example) will increase mt together with 
et. This increase in financial dissaving by the young is reinforced by a 
reduction in saving by the middle-aged, for familiar life-cycle reasons. The 
increase in the scale of the home-country unfunded social security retirement 
scheme reduces saving by the middle aged and therefore reduces further the 
total national stock of non-human assets held by domestic residents23. 
Next consider an example with an unbalanced government budget, in which 
intergenerational redistribution favors financial· saving but hurts human 
capital formation. In period tan (unexpected) one-time tax is levied on the 
old. The from this one-time wealth levy, fit' are used to retirerevenues 
public debt. Following the wealth levy, the present discounted value of net 
future tax receipts is therefore reduced by fit. This "present value tax 
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dividend" can be distributed across generations in such a manner that the 
present discounted value of lifetime taxes for all current and future 
generations (except the unfortunate current old) is lower. For instance, one 
could give the middle-aged each period, beginning in period t, the same size 
tax cut, with the value of the per capita tax cut determined by the 
requirement that its present discounted value be equal to fit. 
This policy would clearly raise the permanent income (at given wages and 
interest rates) of all generations born in period t-1 or later. It would 
therefore reduce the expenditure of time and traded goods on human capital 
formation (and the associated borrowing) during youth by all generations born 
in period tor later •• Current and future middle-aged all increase their 
saving for life-cycle purposes. Again, human capital formation and financial 
saving move in opposite directions. 
These two examples make it clear that the proposition, that any 
intergenerational redistribution policy that raises Tt for all twill have a 
positive effect on human capital formation and a negative effect on 
conventionally measured financial saving, is perfectly general when the 
interest rate exceeds the growth rate of population. Without much loss of 
generality, consider balanced-budget redistribution policies only24 • The 
lower permanent income represented by the increase in Tt increases human 
capital formation while young and reduces consumption while old. Increased 
human capital formation implies increased dissaving (borrowing) by the young. 
A lower value of c! is only consistent with increased saving by generation t 
during middle age, if r! increases by more than c! falls. In fact, 
2
balanced-budget redistribution that increases Tt requires rt to fall if the 
interest rate in period t exceeds the population growth rate, that is, the 
redistribution scheme has to be from the middle aged (T~ increases) to the old 
(Tt decreases). 
How worried should policy authorities interested in boosting economic 
growth be, in our model, about the reduction in private saving associated with 
an increase in Tt? Clearly, to the extent that the reduction in private 
saving represents a reduction in saving by the middle-aged, it is at the 
expense of the growth of national non-human wealth (at the expense of fixed 
2 
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~apital formation in a closed economy) without any compensating increase in 
human wealth. If the reduction in conventionally measured financial saving is 
there is a matchinginstead due to increased dissaving by the young, 
Depending on whose privateunrecorded increase in the value of human capital. 
saving is reduced and on the relative social yields on human and non-human 
assets, the financial crowding out of private saving by public borrowing (or 
by policies with equivalent intergenerational redistribution effects) may be 
growth-promoting rather than growth-inhibiting. 
(5) CONCLUSION. 
The literature on endogenous growth models has emphasized economies of 
and barriers toscale, differences in technology and in industrial structure, 
trade in factors and/or commodities as sources of persistent and permanent 
international productivity growth rate differentials. In a fully integrated 
global economy with free technology transfer and financial capital mobility, 
constant returns to scale implies global convergence of the level and growth 
rate of output per worker despite differences in national savings rates. Our 
paper offers a complementary (and non-rival) approach to those discussed 
elsewhere for differences in household characteristics and in fiscal policies 
affecting household behavior to lead to permanent international productivity 
growth rate differentials. 
Non-tradedness of an essential growth input or the presence of a binding 
self-financing constraint on expenditures for education and training suffice 
to create a role for differences in household behavior (and thus for policies 
influencing household behavior) as sources of persistent and even permanent 
This holds eveninternational differences in productivity growth rates. 
though there is perfect international mobility of financia125 and physical 
though industrial structure and technology identicalcapital and even are 
across the world and returns to scale are constant. 
In our model, a higher rate of time preference will lower a country's 
relative rate of growth by reducing its rate of accumulation of human capital. 
A higher public debt burden will, to the extent that it represents a net 
intergenerational redistribution towards the old, increase a country's growth 
rate of human capital and output relative to the rest of the world. More 
generally, deficit financing policies and lump-sum intergenerational 
redistribution policies that boost conventionally measured financial saving 
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will reduce human capital accumulation. The level of the growth rate of the 
country that raises its public debt burden could of course decline, since a 
higher public debt burden also lowers financial saving and physical capital 
formation. 
Since human capital accumulation involves positive external effects, 
Pareto-efficiency requires subsidies to education or, in our model, a tax on 
leisure or a wage subsidy. The same result can of course also be achieved 
through administrative assignment of time and resources spent on schooling, 
overriding individual choice. Improvements over the unassisted decentralized 
equilibrium that fall short of full Pareto efficiency can be achieved by 
subsidizing private borrowing for educational expenditure (student loans). 
In our model with an essential non-traded input in education, when public 
spending on education is equally efficient as private spending, an increase in 
.public spending on education will crowd out private spending more than 
one-for-one, because this public transfer in kind is equivalent to an increase 
in the life-time lump-sum transfer received by each generation receiving it. 
In the alternative model with a binding self-financing constraint on education 
expenditures, an increase in public spending on education and an equal present 
value increase in life-time lump-sum transfers are not equivalent since the 
household is unable to borrow against future resources to finance current 
expenditures while young. If the household's borrowing constraint remains 
binding, then public spending for education raises the growth rate. 
A distributionally neutral increase in the subsidy rate to student loans 
and increase in lump-sum taxes will raise the relative growth rate of 
productivity. A distributionally neutral increase in a general 
residence-based tax on lending (subsidy to borrowing) has the same effect. 
The effects of a residence-based tax increase on the middle-aged can be fully 
offset by a suitable change in the net lump-sum transfer to this generation. 
29 
APPENDIX 
This appendix provides the information necessary to derive the effects of 
1 
taste and policy parameter perturbations on household choices of et, mt, ct 
2
and ct reported in the text. Totally differentiating ~quations (34) - (37) 
and substituting out the result for (34) to eliminate de! yields the following 
equation system: 
1 1-r.,;¢ /3u"(c) -(v" clt )+w¢11/3u" cc » -r.,;¢1/Ju' cc!> de!1 t t 
0 r.,;¢12 r.,;¢22 det 
1
u" (c )t
-(1 + 2 2 ) r.,;¢1 0 dmt 
(l+r -0 ) /3u"(c)t+2 t+2 t 
¢ I 10 r.,; lu (ct) r.,;¢12/Ju'(c!) 




(l+r -0 )/3u"(c)2 2 t+2 t+2 t 
0 0 
+ -1 + 0 d0t+2 • 
-m 
We assume that u(c) and v(l) are strictly concave and that¢ satisfies ¢1
, ¢2 
> O, ¢ ¢ < O, ¢ > 0 and ¢ ¢ -¢ ¢ ~ 0. It is straightforward to11 , 22 12 11 22 12 12 
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FOOTNOTES 
1see e.g. Romer [1986, 1987, 1989, 1990a,b,c], Lucas (1988], Grossman and 
Helpman [1989a,b,c,d; 1990; 1991], Young (1989], Azariadis and Drazen [1990], 
Feenstra [1990] and Quah and Rauch (1990]. 
2 In the macroeconomic literature Lucas [1988, pp.14-17] recognizes and 
emphasizes the importance of factor mobility assumptions for the predictions 
of nee-classical growth theory. It is equally important for endogenous growth 
theory with constant returns (of which our paper is an example) and for 
endogenous growth theory with increasing returns. 
3Recent examples of studies that investigate national differences in per 
capita output levels and growth rates using as (one of) the technological 
maintained hypotheses the constant or decreasing returns to augmentable 
factors of production model and the common global technology of production 
include the empirical studies of Barro [1989a,b], King and Rebelo [1989], 
Benhabib and Jovanovic (1989] and Cohen [1990]. For more on the facts on 
'. convergence see Baumol (1986] and Baumol, Blackman and Wolff [1987]. Easterly 
[1989] has a technology that can exhibit increasing returns to scale but 
focuses on the case of constant returns to reproducible factors and either a 
constant value for the irreproducible factor or independence of output from 
the irreproducible factor in steady state. In Easterly [1990] the model is 
simplified to exhibit constant returns to reproducible factors. 
Irreproducible factors play no role. Finally, Edwards [1989] develops and 
tests a simple model of growth in developing countries in which the assumption 
of access to a common global technology is abandoned. It is replaced by one 
of gradual catching up by a technologically backward nation to the higher 
external level of technology. The rate at which a country catches up is 
postulated to be an increasing function of the degree of external orientation 
in the country's international trade relations. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1990b] use a model without factor mobility to 
analyze convergence of growth rates among regions within a nation state (the 
states of the USA). They recognize that this framework is unrealistic for 
countries and especially for the U.S. states and note that extensions of the 
neoclassical growth model that allow for features of an open economy tend to 
speed up the predicted rate of convergence. 
4Two-country exogenous growth models with a Samuelson [1958]-Diamond 
[1965] OLG household sector include Buiter [1981] and Buiter and Kletzer 
(1990, 1991a]. Two-country exogenous growth models with a Yaari-Blanchard 
uncertain lifetimes OLG household sector include Frenkel and Razin (1987] and 
Buiter [1989]. A very simple two-country endogenous growth model with the 
Samuelson-Diamond OLG household sector is developed in Buiter and Kletzer 
[1991b]. A two-country endogenous growth model with the Yaari-Blanchard OLG 
household sector is studied by Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg [1991]. Closed 
economy endogenous growth models with a Samuelson~Diamond OLG household sector 
have been developed by Azariadis and Drazen [1990] and by Jones and Manuelli 
[1990b]; the Yaari-Blanchard version has been studied by Alogoskoufis and van 
der Ploeg [1990a,b]. 
5other papers analyzing the consequences of the use of distortionary 
taxes in (closed) endogenous growth models with a representative agent 
household sector are Rebelo [1990], King and Rebelo [1990] and Barro and Sala 
Martin [1990a]. The latter also consider productive public spending. Jones 
and Manuelli [1990a] analyze an infinite-lived representative agent version 
i 
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of the open economy endogenous growth model with distortionary taxes. 
6rn general, non-decreasing returns in both production processes is 
necessary for endogenous growth. 
7we were not aware of the contribution of Azariadis and Drazen 
(henceforth A&D) when the first version of this paper was written. The focus 
of the A&D paper is quite different from ours. Using a model of a closed 
economy, they emphasize nonconvexities in the production and accumulation of 
human capital as a source of possible multiple locally stable stationary 
equilibria. When there are no traded inputs in the human capital production 
technology, our specification of the human capital accumulation technology can 
be written as follows: 
1 1 1 
ht/ht-1 = 1 + net/ht-1 n > 0. 
A special but informative case of the human capital accumulation 
technology of A&D (given in their equation (13b)) can, using our notation, be 
written as 
where; is an increasing function of 
1
h with a finite upper bound. The non-convexity in the human capital
t-1 
production function of A&D can generate "threshold externalities" (radical 
differences in dynamic behavior arising from local variations in social 
returns to scale). Multiple steady states with significantly different levels 
of education and training can be associated with small differences in initial 
conditions, giving rise to "development traps". 
Our constant returns to scale production function of human capital rules 
out this particular source of multiplicity of steady states. Like any Diamond 
OLG mode, however, our model may well possess multiple stationary equilibria 
for the global economy. We do not study the behavior of the aggregate global 
economy but instead focus on permanent differences between the growth rates of 
labor productivity of the two countries that make up the global economy. 
These can occur, in or out of steady state, despite the assumption of 
identical, constant returns technologies and despite the equalization of the 
ratio of physical to human capital brought about by perfect international 
mobility of financial capital and the absence of source-based capital income 
taxation. 
BNote that unless, through vigorous intermarriage a la Bernheim and 
Bagwell [1988], all of society effectively constitutes one big happy family, 
the human capital formation externality, whose domain is both 
intergenerational and across families or dynasties, will not be fully 
internalized even if one assumed universal operative intergenerational gift 
motives. 
0 1 2 
9Each household of each generation t takes wt+l' rt+l' rt+2 , ht, Tt, rt, 
0t+l' 0t+2 , ~t+l and gt as given. 
10u(.) and v(.) are increasing, strictly quasi-concave, twice 
continuously differentiable and satisfy the Inada conditions 
lim u(x) = lim v(x) = 1/lim u(x) = 1/lim v(x) = 0; P > 0. 
x--+w x--+w x-+O x-+O 
11Assuming imperfect substitutability between m and g would result in 
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additional tedious algebra, but would not qualitatively change the effects of 
g on human capital formation and private financial saving, as long as an 
increase in g does not reduce the marginal products of education and private 
traded inputs. 
12 
Recent empirical evidence that capital market imperfections constrain 
individuals' educational attainments is given by Behrman, Kletzer, McPherson 
and Schapiro [1992] and by Cameron and Heckman [1992], who find that family 
financial resources are a significant determinant of education levels. 
13see Buiter and Kletzer [1992] for an analysis of the conditions under 
which the conventional government solvency constraint (22a) is implied by more 
robust notions of feasibility of government tax, spending and financing plans. 
14 For a steady state to exist, preferences must be homothetic. 
15 When the constraint mt~ 0 binds, the value of the marginal product of 
traded inputs in the human capital accumulation process is below the after-tax 









). Equation (36) is dropped 
and mt= 0 in this case. 
16To achieve an equilibrium for this 2-country economy that is Pareto 
efficient, the two governments are required to subsidize human capital 
formation in order to internalize the externality and to forswear the use of 
distortionary taxes. They also should refrain from choosing values of their 
*
human capital accumulation inputs g and g that make the constraints m ~ 0 or 
m* ~ 0 binding. In addition one of the governments may have to use lump-sum 
taxes and transfers to ensure dynamic efficiency. The first-best policy to 
internalize the externality is to subsidize time spent by the young in 
education, et. In our model such an education subsidy is equivalent either to 
a subsidy on the wage earned by the middle aged or to a tax on leisure. 
If in our model we also permitted the young to work (in addition to 
choosing between leisure and education), and if work did not produce a human 
capital externality, then the equivalence between a subsidy to education, a 
tax on leisure and a wage subsidy to the middle-aged would break down. 
Efficiency would then require a subsidy to education or a tax both on leisure 
and on time spent working while young. The equivalence between an education 
subsidy and a tax on leisure would also breaks down when the middle-aged can 
choose leisure, unless age discrimination can be built into the leisure tax. 
A subsidy to borrowing by the young for educational expenditures is not needed 
in the first best. If a tax on leisure or a wage subsidy are not feasible, 
then subsidizing student loans will be a second-best policy. Subsidizing 
private borrowing in general will be next best. 
17It is easy to consider the difference made by the existence of national 
source-based taxation (say at a constant rate Oin the home country and 0* in 
the foreign country) of the rental income from capital instead of national 
Studentresidence-based taxation of the income from all non-human wealth. 
loan subsidies are also omitted for simplicity. With free international 
mobility of financial capital we now have equalization of after-tax rates of 
* ~ ~* *
return to physical capital, that is rt= rt= (1-Vt)f'(kt) = (1-Vt)f'(kt). 
37 
a common 
technology, the home country wage rate will be above the foreign wage rate if 
With source-based capital taxation, perfect capital mobility and 
~ Ao*and only if U is below • Even if all other private and policy parameters 
are identical, different wage rates will be associated with different 
productivity growth rates. A higher wage rate during middle age increases the 
rate of return to education. Unless the income effect of a higher wage on the 
demand for leisure is very strong, the country with the higher real wage will 
have the higher growth rate of productivity. 
18 If the preference ordering generating Ut defined in equation (1) is 
homothetic, it follows that 
2 2 1 2 2 {) l 
/3 u(ct) + /3u(ct) + v(lt) = A[/3 u(ct/A) + u(ct/A) + v(lt/A)) for all A> O. 
- 19 The steady-state effects of a change in Oare the same as the impact 
effects of equal changes in ot+l and ot+2 • 
20in the framework of this paper, any consequences of lump-sum financing 
of ,say, increased home country public spending on education would affect 
domestic and foreign interest rates and wage rates equally. This would 
therefore not alter productivity growth differentials. 
21 In period t the government can only change r!_1 
, the tax on the middle 
2
aged, and rt_ , the tax on the old. Period t human capital formation is 
2 
performed by the young in that period, that is by generation t. Human capital 
formation in period twill only be a function of expectations at time t 
. 1 d 2concerning rt an rt. The behavior of members of generation t during period t 
is therefore only affected by tax changes in period t to the extent that such 
changes in r!_ and r!_ carry announcement effects concerning r! and r!, the 1 2 
taxes they will pay when middle-aged and old. Of course, if the changes in 
r!_ and r!_ are news with respect to the information set of period t-1, then 
1 2 
the saving behavior of the middle-aged in period twill be affected. The 
scope for time-inconsistent policy behavior in a model like ours is clearly 
considerable. For reasons of space these issues will not be considered 
further. 
are 
considering may be dynamically inefficient, we shall consider the consequences 
of a cut in lump-sum taxes during period t when the interest rate is above the 
growth rate of physical capital in each period, which is sufficient for 
dynamic efficiency in our non-stochastic model. Any government, acting 
unilaterally, could issue debt or vary lump-sum taxation to achieve a national 
Pareto improvement if dynamic inefficiency prevailed (see Buiter and Kletzer 
[1990a, 1990b]). In steady state, the growth rate of physical capital equals 
the growth rate of population, n, plus the growth rate of per capita human 
capital. The latter is non-negative in our model. If the interest rate 
exceeds the steady-state growth rate of aggregate human capital it therefore 
also exceeds n. 
22 While the competitive equilibria of OLG models such as the one we 
2 3This does not require the interest rate to be above the population 
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growth rate. 
24rf the government could also levy lump-sum taxes on the young, there 
would not be any loss of generality in restricting ourselves to balanced 
budget redistribution schemes. See Buiter and Kletzer [1992]. 
25 In the self-financing constraint interpretation of our model, financial 
markets are clearly imperfect. The inability to borrow in order to finance 
education and training, however, excludes the young equally from the domestic 
and from the international financial markets. 
